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CRISIS IN CANADIAN BANKING 
Kelly Dean 
Introduction 
Until the autumn of 1985, Canada's high-
ly concentrated and loosely regulated banking 
industry had gone for 62 years without a bank 
failure. But in early September 1985, two 
Alberta institutions, Canadian Commercial 
Bank (CCB) and Northland Bank, collapsed. 
These were Canada's tenth and eleventh larg-
est banks respectively. Mismanagement and 
poor conditions in energy lending and real 
estate in Canada's western region were the 
main causes of ruin for the two wholesale 
banks. 
CCB and Northland were relatively young 
banks, created in the mid-1970s in response to 
the Western prairie capitalist's call for a region-
al banking system. Many small businessmen in 
Western Canada felt alienated from the six 
large banks that dominate Canadian banking. 
These businessmen hoped that the creation of 
regional banks would provide the desired ex-
pansion of credit in Western Canada which was 
at that time a region booming from the thriving 
oil industry. Their wish came true. Eight re-
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gional banks were created in the mid-1970s. 
However, by 1985 two of the eight young banks 
had failed. Additionally, Mercantile Bank of 
Canada was damaged by bank runs caused by 
the panic following the failure of CCB and 
Northland, and was subsequently taken over by 
National Bank of Canada. Later a fourth bank-
Continental Bank of Canada-was liquidated. 
The creation of regional banks has greatly 
altered Canada's banking system. However, the 
change in the banking system was not accom-
panied by a change in the banking regulatory 
system, especially in the area of examination. 
In this paper, I argue that if Canada wishes to 
retain regional banking to answer the needs of 
small businesses, the regulatory system will 
have to undergo significant changes, especial-
ly in its examination capacity. Furthermore, I 
show that regardless of whether Canada chooses 
to retain the regional banking system, current 
bank regulation is inadequate. 
I proceed by first giving a detailed account 
of the factors leading to the collapse of Cana-
dian Commercial Bank (CCB) and Northland. 
Next, I examine the consequences of these 
bank failures upon Canada's banking system, 
taxpayers, shareholders and bank regulation; 
and I conclude by discussing the future of 
Canadian bank regulation. 
Overview Of The Canadian Banking 
System 
Canada's banking system has two tiers: 1) 
Schedule A banks, which are owned by Cana-
dians, and 2) Schedule B banks, which are 
under foreign control. Schedule A banks con-
trol 94% of Canada's domestic assets while 
Schedule B banks control the remaining 6% 
(Hanley, 1985, p.5). Before the collapse ofCCB 
and Northland, the Canadian banking industry 
consisted of 14 domestic banks (see Table 1). 
Control of 95% of the country's bank assets is 
concentrated in Canada's Big Six: Royal Bank 
of Canada, Bank of Montreal, Canadian Im-
perial Bank of Commerce, Bank of Nova Scotia, 
Toronto Dominion Bank and National Bank of 
Canada. At the time of their collapse, CCB and 
Northland Bank together accounted for less 
than 1% of Canadian bank assets. 
Regulation of Canadian Banks began in 
1923, after the failure of the Home Bank of 
Canada. At this time, the Office of the Inspector 
General of Banks was instituted. The Inspector 
General is responsible to the Minister of Fi-
nance and conducts an annual examination of 
each bank to ensure compliance with the Bank 
Act. The Bank Act is Canada's law governing its 
banking activities. The Act is revised every 
ten years. 
Salomon Brothers conducted a study of 
Canadian banks in November 1985. In its opin-
ion, the role of the Inspector General of Banks 
tends to be reactive rather than proactive in 
regards to bank problems (Hanley, 1985, p.4). -
The Office of the Inspector General reacts to 
the demonstrated performance of banks by 
means of oral or written guidelines (Hanley, 
1985, p.4). For example, rather than issuing 
specific regulations to tighten control over the 
banks, the Inspector General of Banks typically 
TABLE 1 
CANADIAN BANKS 
Ranked byassetsasofJuly31, 1985and their provisions for loan losses for the period0ctober31, 1985toJuly 
31, 1985. 
LOANWSS 
1985 ASSETS, IN RESERVES, IN 
BANK HEADQUARTERS BILLIONS ($C) MILLIONS ($C) 
Royal Bank of Canada Montreal $91.7 $463.0 
Bank of Montreal Montreal 80.0 311.7 
Canadian Imperial Bank 
of Commerce Toronto 73.8 360.0 
Bank of Nova Scotia Toronto 58.1 224.2 
Toronto Dominion Bank Toronto 50.3 191.9 
National Bank of Canada Montreal 21.5 97.1 
Continental Bank of Canada Toronto 6.2 22.9 
Mercantile Bank of Canada Montreal 4.4 20.9 
Bank of British Columbia Vancouver 3.2 10.3 
Canadian Commercial Bank*+ Edmonton 2.7 7.2 
Northland Bank* Calgary 1.4 4.8 
The Morguard Bank of Canada Vancouver 0.3 0.8 
The Western & Pacific Bank 
of Canada Vancouver 0.1 0.2 
Bank of Alberta Edmonton 0.1 n.a. 
• Banks that failed. 
+ Bank closed Sept. 1, 1985. Data for period Oct. 31, 1984 to June 30, 1985. 
Source: The Canadian Bankers Association data as presented in the New York Times October 4, 1985, p. Dl. 
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discusses new rules with bank representatives 
before their introduction. Additionally, al-
though the Inspector General's Office con-
ducts a limited review, it is the bank's internal 
and shareholder auditors who actually conduct 
the annual examination of each bank (Hanley, 
1985, p.4). 
The Rise And Fall Of The Western 
Canadian Banks 
Creation of the Western Banks 
Unlike American banks, Canada's Big Six 
are national in scope, offering complete branch 
banking services through nearly 7,000 branches 
across the country. However, in the opinion of 
many Western Canadians, the Big Six could 
not or would not address the needs of the West-
em prairie capitalists (Maclean's, November 4, 
1985, p. 52). Many Canadians felt that as the 
Big Six became larger, they lost the incentive 
to compete, which often resulted in higher in-
terest rates for consumers and small business-
men. The high interest rates especially hurt the 
small businessmen in need of credit who are 
located in Western Canada. According to Alan 
Wade (November 1985, p. 31), some Western 
Canadians have the same dislike for Toronto's 
big banks that some Americans have for New 
York's. Such feelings of alienation fueled the 
dream of creating regional banks which would 
not ignore the needs of a particular region. 
The economic booms of the 1960s and 
1970s which centered upon the thriving Cana-
dian oil industry led to an increased demand for 
the expansion of credit. Many Western Cana-
dians dicovered they could not secure loans 
from the national banks and trust companies 
based in Central Canada (Maclean's, November 
4, 1985, p. 52). Even those who did secure loans 
from the Big Six reportedly complained of 
"high-handed treatment." Economist Warren 
Blackman presented one example of this 
"high-handed treatment" in Maclean's, when 
he noted that the Big Six "would unilaterally 
shift money from a business's deposit account 
to put against a loan without consultation" 
(Maclean's, November 4, 1985, p. 52). 
In an effort to escape the feelings of bank 
alienation, the provinces began to apply politi-
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cal pressure to the Prime Minister for the crea-
tion of regional banks. In 1973, four western 
provinces argued in a brief to Prime Minister 
Trudeau that western banks would "infuse ef-
fective competition into the banking industry 
in the securing of deposits and the making of 
loans, (thereby) extending considerably greater 
assistance to the small-scale and risky ven-
tures" (The Banker, February 1986, p. 40). 
The call for regional banks became suc-
cessful with the creation of eight such banks 
during the mid-1970s. The advent of regional 
banking represented a significant change in 
Canada's banking system. However, the regu-
latory system was not altered to parallel the 
change in the banking system, especially in the 
area of examination. For example, the regional 
banks tended to concentrate in energy loans-
especially in oil, a notorious "boom to bust" 
industry. This alone prompted the regulators 
to examine the regional banks more closely. 
Two Alberta banks, Canadian Commercial 
Bank (CCB) and Northland, were created in 
1976. CCB of Edmonton was formed as a com-
mercial bank, whose primary purpose was to 
make loans to small businesses. Calgary-based 
Northland Bank was formed to meet the in-
creasing demands for sizeable loans from West-
em businessmen in the energy and real estate 
sectors. Both new banks expanded rapidly, 
concentrating on the then-booming energy 
and real estate sectors in Alberta and British 
Columbia. At the time, Alberta produced over 
85% of Canada's petroleum and gas, with the 
majority of petroleum and gas firms headquar-
tered in Calgary (Business America, p. 15). 
Alberta's economy was hit hard in 1982 
with a combination of falling energy demand, 
record high interest rates and a Canadian (and 
worldwide) recession (Business America, p. 15). 
The deep recession hit the young banks espe-
cially hard. Oil and commodity prices declined 
in the early 1980s, as the demand for oil fell 
(The Banker, February 1986, p. 40). Usage of 
drilling rigs decreased to 30% in 1982, down 
from a 43% utilization rate in 1981. Real estate 
prices also declined. According to William 
Hancock, Vice-President of Royal LePage Com-
mercial Real Estate Services in Calgary, the 
upward trend of Alberta real estate prices re-
versed sharply in early 1982; and by 1983 real 
estate prices had fallen on average by a disas-
trous 50%, back to their 1978levels (Maclean's, 
April 8, 1985, p. 31). Additionally, Alberta's 
unemployment rate rose from 3.8% in 1981 to 
11.2% in 1984. This sudden increase in unem-
ployment caused many homeowners to default 
on their mortgage payments. In 1984, for 
example, Alberta experienced 8,023 foreclo-
sures, compared to only 626 in 1981 
(Maclean's, April 8, 1985, p. 31). As a result, 
financial institutions were left with mortgage 
loans whose collateral had plummeted 50% 
in value. 
The Fall of Canadian Commercial 
Bank 
Mismanagement plays a part in all bank 
failures. In 1981, CCB president G. Howard 
Eaton recommended expanding CCB through 
Westlands Bank of Santa Anna, California, a 
company that was carrying a large percentage 
of risky loans to U.S. energy companies. CCB 
acquired 39% ofWestlands in 1981. During the 
recession, CCB's president skipped town and 
country to move to California. AMaclean 's arti-
cle (December 23, 1985, p. 26) reports that 
"instead of condemning the move, the bank's 
board approved an interest-reduced loan of $1 
million to help him (Eaton) settle snugly in 
Santa Barbara" where he supposedly ran CCB 
by long-distance telephone conversations. 
Meanwhile, a 1982 Inspector General inspec-
tion of CCB revealed its lack of diversification. 
Two-thirds of CCB's uncollected interest was 
on energy property loans and another 16% was 
on energy-related assets (The Banker, February 
1986, p. 40). 
More scandalous than Eaton's move to 
California was his association with Leonard 
Rosenburg, "the controversial Ontario-based 
financier whose trust company empire crum-
bled in notoriety and was taken over by the 
Ontario government" (Maclean's, September 
23, 1985, p. 31). With Eaton's help, Rosenburg 
became CCB's largest shareholder, purchasing 
27% of the bank's shares without the knowl-
edge of the board's directors. According to the 
Bank Act, a single shareholder is not allowed to 
own more than 10% of a domestic bank. Peter 
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C. Newman of Maclean's (December 23, 1985, 
p. 26) questioned the wisdom of allowing 
Rosenburg to control a Schedule A bank when 
he could not operate a small trust company. 
Eaton was forced to resign on January 23, 1983, 
after his relationship with Rosenburg was 
made public. Gerald McLaughlan succeeded 
Eaton as CCB's president. 
Mter Eaton's resignation, the Bank of 
Canada Governor, Gerald Bouey, telephoned 
The Globe and Mail to tell reporters that, de-
spite the Rosenburg connection, the CCB was 
still at that point in time "a solvent and profit-
able bank" (Maclean's, December 23, 1985, p. 
26). Also Eaton's successor, Gerald McLaughlan, 
did not attempt to reverse the issuance of risky 
loans. Despite this, both Bouey and the Minis-
ter of State for Finance (Barbara McDougall) 
continuously issued assurances about CCB's 
financial health. 
In 1984, the U. S. Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC) examined West-
lands and found serious problems, including 
hazardous lending, lax collection processes, 
inadequate loan provisions and poor manage-
ment. The FDIC subsequently notified the In-
spector General of Banks (Canadian Business, 
December 1985, p. 149). The fact that aU. S. 
regulator tolled the first warning bell to a 
Canadian regulatory agency depicts the severe 
weakness of Canadian bank regulation, espe-
cially in the area of examination. 
CCB suffered a loss of C$6.9 million for 
the fiscal year ending October 31, 1984 
(Maclean's, April8, 1985, p. 31). As reported in 
Maclean's (April 8, 1985, p. 1) the loss was 
mainly the result of $194 million in nonper-
forming loans (loans on which interest has not 
been paid for more than 90 days) and interest 
revenue falling. Although still suffering from 
the financial strains in Alberta and apparently 
unaffected by the FDIC findings, CCB acquired 
the remaining 61% of Westland's assets in 
June, 1984. 
Endangering CCB's financial position fur-
therwas the reduction in oil prices. On January 
30, 1985, the official price of oil was lowered by 
$1.40 to $39.20 per barrel by OPEC (Canadian 
Business, December 1985, p. 34). As a result, 
exploration for oil was cut back drastically. For 
CCB, this meant that U. S.-based oil and gas 
drilling companies ceased interest payments to 
Westlands on $100 million in loans (Maclean's, 
AprilS, 1985, p. 31). Mter selling the collateral 
backing of the loans and still facing bad Cana-
dian real estate loans, CCB faced a loss of about 
$89 million in 1985 (Maclean's, September23, 
1985, p. 31). Consequently in March 1985 CCB 
sought help from the Canadian government. At 
that time Gerald McLaughlan, CCB's second 
president, asked William Kennett, the Inspec-
tor General of Banks, for a bailout. 
The Fall of Northland Bank 
Like CCB, Northland bank suffered from 
the recession in Western Canada. Northland 
Bank's asset base was also heavily concen-
trated in the energy and real estate sectors of 
Alberta and British Columbia. Basically, how-
ever, it was Northland Bank's rapid growth and 
risky lending practices which eventually led to 
its demise. The bank had grown from $388 mil-
lion in assets in 1981 to $1.3 billion by mid-
1985 (Maclean's, October 7, 1985, p. 40). This 
stunning growth, fed by the oil boom of pre 
vious years, was not uncommon in Alberta dur-
ing this period. 
One example of Northland's aggressive 
and risky banking procedures was its decision 
to refinance Calaway Park (an amusement 
park) after several previous lenders (Bank of 
Canada and Bank of America Canada) decided 
that the project was too risky. Northland took 
over the two banks' loans at 55 cents on the 
dollar, leaving itself with a total loan of $13 
million (Maclean's, October 7, 1985, p. 40). 
This was quite risky considering the state of 
the economy and the projections that the 
amusement park would be in the red for several 
years to come. 
The federal government's announcement 
of a rescue package for CCB in March, 1985, in 
tum provoked nervous depositors to withdraw 
huge amounts of funds from Northland; for the 
announcement seemed to illuminate the risky 
lending practices of regional banks in general. 
Thus it was that financial problems -largely 
the result of the aggressive and risky loan-
making procedures, coupled with the deep re-
cession -led the government to close North-
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land's doors six months later on September 
1, 1985. 
The Attempted Rescue Of CCB And 
Northland 
On March 24, 1985, Canada's federal gov-
ernment announced a C$255 million rescue 
package for CCB. The bailout was financed by 
the federal and provincial governments along 
with the Big Six. Canada's Big Six contributed 
a total of C$60 million to the bailout. 
The rationale behind the bank rescue ap-
peared valid at the time. Bank regulators were 
concerned over the financial panic that might 
ensue since Canada had not witnessed the 
demise of one of its own banks for 62 years. The 
rescue package was intended, therefore, to re-
store investor confidence and to halt any runs 
on all regional banks. The federal government 
was also responding to political pressure to 
save a regional bank. 
The Inspector General of Banks, William 
Kennett, proposed that CCB could be restored 
as a viable bank with the aid of the rescue pack-
age and through the sale of the bank's real 
estate assets. Instead of being able to sell the 
real estate assets at 55% of their value, as 
estimated by the bank's auditors, however, the 
bank subsequently found it could only unload 
the assets at 30-35% of their value (Maclean's, 
September 23, 1985, p. 30). This mistake only 
served to intensify the controversy and thus 
created additional problems for CCB's at-
tempted rescue. 
Rather than simply restoring investor 
confidence, the announcement of the bailout 
had an unintended side effect: it illuminated 
the financial problems of CCB and other small 
institutions. As a result, depositors began 
withdrawing funds from CCB and from other 
small banks. Mter the initial rescue attempt, 
CCB depositors withdrew C$1.6 billion of 
approximately C$2.8 billion of deposits 
(Maclean's, September 23, 1985, p. 30). Some 
claim that even the Big Six banks, which had 
contributed C$60 million to the C$255 million 
rescue package, removed large amounts of de-
posits (United States Banker, p. 29). Mean-
while, depositors also began to pull funds out 
of Northland Bank as the banking crisis spread. 
Thus, the federal government's intention of 
restoring confidence in the regional banks 
had failed. 
In response to the rapid withdrawal of 
funds by depositors, the Canadian government 
continued to pour in loans to CCB and North-
land to maintain liquidity. By July 1985, the 
Bank of Canada had injected a total of C$1.6 
billion into CCB, compared to the C$17 million 
which it had provided before the bailout in 
March (Canadian Business, December 1985, p. 
149). Canadian law only allows this sort of aid 
to floundering banks for six months. Thus, in 
September 1985, the loans ceased. 
Concurrently, George Hitchman, former 
deputy chairman of the Bank of Nova Scotia, 
was appointed to investigate CCB's books. In 
August 1985, Hitchman completed his report. 
Hitchman found that of CCB's C$2.4 billion in 
loans, C$1 billion were worthless (Canadian 
Business, December 1985, p. 150). His report 
also cited unacceptable banking practices and 
mismanagement. Additionally, Hitchman dis-
covered that internal documents identified 
C$471 million in bad loans. However, only 
C$83 million of that total had become part of 
the C$255 million rescue package (Canadian 
Business, December 1985, p. 150). How such a 
substantial amount of bad loans could escape 
the eyes of the bank's board, auditors and the 
Inspector General remains unclear. 
In summary, the bailout of the banks was 
flawed in two ways. First, the initial C$255 
million was based on an inaccurate appraisal of 
the CCB's condition. Second, instead of restor-
ing investor confidence as intended, news of 
the bailout provoked a crisis in depositors' con-
fidence in the regional banking system as a 
whole. Thus, faced with a banking crisis that 
appeared to be getting progressively worse, the 
federal government closed the doors of both 
CCB and Northland on September 1, 1985. The 
Bank of Canada had provided more than C$1.6 
billion in short-term loans to CCB and $699 
million to Northland (The Banker, October 
1985, p. 9). 
These two bank failures were to have far-
reaching effects, many of which will be dis-
cussed in the following section. In October 
1985, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney appoint-
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ed Supreme Court Justice William Zebedee 
Estey to investigate the bank failures. In addi-
tion to investigating further the reason why 
the banks failed, the Estey Commission is ex-
pected to make recommendations on how to 
improve Canada's banking system. (The Estey 
Commission Report was not completed at the 
time of this writing.) 
Ramifications Of The Alberta Bank 
Failures 
Effects on the Other Regional 
Banks 
The Canadian government's attempted 
bailout of CCB represented a change from the 
traditional method of dealing with banks in dif-
ficulty, which was to merge ailing banks with 
larger ones. As already noted, the govern-
ment's unprecedented rescue plan of C$255 
million to CCB, intended to calm panic, back-
fired by alerting investors to the unsound lend-
ing practices of regional banks. The govern-
ment's miscalculation of investor reaction 
created a wave of unrest in Canada's banking 
industry as investor speculation resulted in an 
outflow of funds from the banking institutions 
and a decrease in investor purchases of smaller 
banks' commercial paper. Mercantile Bank of 
Canada, the nation's eighth largest bank, and 
Continental Bank of Canada, the nation's sev-
enth largest bank, fell victims to the unrest 
Mercantile was the harder hit of the two 
banks, experiencing withdrawals of $300 mil-
lion by panicky depositors (American Banker, 
October 16, 1985, p. 1). National Bank of 
Canada, Canada's sixth largest bank, even-
tually took over the troubled bank. National 
benefited from the deal by expanding its assets 
approximately 20% and enlarging its base out-
side of Quebec (The Banker, February 1986, 
p. 41). 
Continental Bank of Canada (not related 
to Continental Illinois) also suffered from 
heavy depositor withdrawals. In an effort to 
boost the bank's image and investor confi-
dence, 25 officials from the Big Six audited the 
bank's loan portfolio and concluded that the 
bank had sufficient reserves for its doubtful 
loans (Wall Street Journal). In September 1985, 
however, Continental suffered a loss of C$300 
million of its total $5.6 billion in deposits 
(Canadian Business, April 1986, p. 80). The 
favorable audit was not enough to restore pub-
lic confidence, and so Continental Bank began 
seeking a buyer. In October 1986, Central Capi-
tal, a financial services firm based in Nova 
Scotia, agreed to purchase the leasing unit of 
Continental, while Lloyds Bank PLC of Brit-
ain agreed to buy most of the remaining assets. 
Under the agreement with Lloyds Bank, Conti-
nental consented to liquidate itself, with the 
proceeds to be distributed to its holders (Wall 
Street Journal). 
Thus the dream of regional banking 
turned into a nightmare for small banks during 
what the Canadian press refers to as "Black 
September." Although the dream of regional 
banking has been deeply damaged, many still 
yearn for a less concentrated banking system. 
As University of Calgary economist Warren 
Blackman states, "The test of a banking system 
is not if it fails, but whether or not it meets the 
needs of the business community" (Maclean's, 
November 4, 1985, p. 52). In reality, however, 
the failures and mergers have further reduced 
competition in an already heavily concentrated 
banking industry. 
Effects on Taxpayers, Shareholders 
and General Public 
Although CCB and Northland together 
accounted for less than 1% of Canadian bank-
ing assets, their fall and bailout brought with 
them considerable expense to taxpayers and 
shareholders. Taxpayers ultimately footed the 
bill for the flawed bailouts at an estimated cost 
of C$875 million (Maclean's, November 4, 
1985, p. 43). In effect, the taxpayers paid the 
price to cover losses "incurred by incompetent 
bankers and imprudent investors" (Maclean's, 
November 4, 1985, p. 44). 
CCB shareholders also paid a heavy price. 
The price of CCB shares plummeted from 
C$19.62 to $5.25 per share during the two-day 
halt of trading in March when the bailout was 
announced (Maclean's, April 8, 1985, p. 31). 
Two of the shareholders of CCB stock lost a 
combined total of C$355,500. The two share-
holders have threatened to file lawsuits if they 
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can prove that CCB issued shares in January, 
1984 without revealing its state of affairs. Pen-
sion fund losses may amount to an additional 
$96 million. 
Peter C. Newman, analyst for Maclean's 
magazine, wrote in December 1985 about the 
effect of Canada's banking crisis on the general 
public. As Newman stated: 
Canadian life has been based, forever 
it seems, on the sanctity of the three 
pillars that sustained our individual 
and collective sense of well-being: 
the family, God and our chartered 
banks. One of the pillars in this con-
fidence-sustaining tripod collapsed 
during 1985, and from now on Cana-
dian bankers will be regarded as noth-
ing more than just another bunch of 
professionals -like chicken pluckers 
who didn't quite meet their quotas 
(Maclean's, December 23, 1985). 
Obviously, the strong belief in the stability of 
the Canadian banking industry was severely 
jolted by the events of 1985. 
Effects on Regulation 
Inspector General of Banks 
The Canadian press repeatedly blamed the 
Office of the Inspector General of Banks for its 
failure to detect the poor quality ofloans issued 
by the two Alberta banks, despite regular ex-
aminations. In May 1985, the House of Com-
mons Committee on Finance, Trade and Eco-
nomic Mfairs launched its own investigation of 
the bailouts. The Commons Committee find-
ings included an internal log from 1981 to 
1985 that listed sixteen occasions on which 
the Inspector General of Banks had had con-
tact with CCB (Canadian Business, December 
1985, p. 151). Additionally, officials of the U. S. 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on Feb-
ruary 20, 1985 had telephoned Inspector Gen-
eral Kennett's office, alerting him of the prob-
lems with CCB's U. S. Subsidiary, the West-
lands Bank (Canadian Business, December 
1985, p. 34). Yet, it was not until March 1985, 
when CCB asked for a bailout, that the Inspec-
tor General of Banks had reacted. As Maclean's 
reported, "(It must be determined) whether 
Kennett was misled by the banks, whether he 
lacked the tools to determine a bank's solvency 
or whether he was not vigilant enough" 
(Maclean's, February 3, 1986, p. 42). 
It should be noted that the Inspector 
General of Banks had a staff of only forty mem-
bers during the banking crisis, only eight of 
them field officers, whose tasks were to cover 
several institutions spread over half a conti-
nent (Euromoney, July 1985, p. 69). Subse-
quent to the failure of CCB, Kennett did, in 
fact, ask for a larger staff, formal contacts with 
bank boards and auditors, and an increase in 
power. But Canada's Bank Act does not give 
Kennett the power to force a bank to act, al-
though he has access to any and all informa-
tion about banks under his jurisdiction (The 
Gazette). Barbara McDougall, Minister of State 
for Finance, is expected to push for legislation 
to fulfill Kennett's requests. 
Canada Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (CDIC) 
The CDIC was created in 1967 after the 
failure of the Atlantic Acceptance Corporation 
and the losses suffered by depositors. The pur-
pose of initiating deposit insurance was to re-
store investor confidence, and deposits were 
insured to a limit of C$20,000 per deposit in 
1967 (Issues in Bank Regulation, p. 56). In 
1983, the deposit insurance was increased to 
C$60,000 per deposit. 
With the failure of CCB and Northland, 
the C$60,000 limit on deposit insurance was 
altered retroactively. Barbara McDougall, Min-
ister of State for Finance, said that special 
legislation would be passed to pay back all 
uninsured depositors, at an estimated cost of 
C$420 million to taxpayers (Maclean's, Sep-
tember 16, 1985, p. 42). The final cost to tax-
payers was, in fact, C$875 million. Not sur-
prisingly, this action provoked severe criticism; 
for many saw the government's action as one 
designed to protect large investors who were 
well aware of the risks associated with placing 
such funds in risky, regional banks. As Robert 
Korthals, president of the Toronto Dominion 
Bank, stated, "It (the action) says that people 
who have taken imprudent risks are smart and 
those who have taken lower rates are fools" 
(Maclean's, September 16, 1985, p. 42). 
Deposit insurance in Canada has recently 
8 
become an important regulatory issue because 
new regulations were not introduced to com-
pensate for the advent of regional banking. The 
purpose of the CDIC is to restore investor con-
fidence in Canada's banking industry. How-
ever, when the CDIC was created twenty years 
ago, Canada's banking institutions were large, 
diversified and professionally managed. Today, 
with Canada's experiment in regional banking 
and the increasing number of foreign-owned 
banks, the stability of the banking industry is 
not so certain. The failures of CCB and North-
land typify the changing times, and as is evi-
dent from their failures, not all banks are 
managed professionally with diversified port-
folios. According to John McCallum: 
The CDIC was never designed to back 
wholesale banks with limited geo-
graphical and loan diversification in 
an environment characterized by ex-
treme interest rates exchange rates 
and business cycle volatility (Issues 
in Bank Regulation, p. 56). 
Thus it appears that the changes in Canada's 
banking industry must be accompanied by 
parallel changes in the policies of the CDIC. 
Effect on the Green Paper 
On April 15, 1985, prior to the bank fail-
ures, Minister of State for Finance McDougall 
issued a discussion paper, The Regulation of 
Canadian Financial Institutions, popularly re-
ferred to as the "Green Paper." The paper's pro-
posals were designed to bring existing federal 
legislation up to date with the rapidly chang-
ing banking industry in Canada. The Green 
Paper focused on two major issues: regulation 
and the need for greater variety of financial 
services. The major innovation suggested ·in 
the paper was to allow greater integration of 
Canada's "four pillars" (a Canadian phrase re-
ferring to commercial banking, insurance, trust 
and investment dealing) through financial hold-
ing company vehicles. More specifically the 
Green Paper proposed that: 
Through a financial holding com-
pany arrangement, nonbank finan-
cial institutions could enter the 
banking industry by establishing a 
"C" bank subsidiary with full com-
mercial lending powers; enter the 
trust industry through a fiduciary 
subsidiary; enter the insurance in-
dustry through an insurance com-
pany subsidiary; and enter the secu-
rities industry through ownership in 
an investment dealer firm, to the ex-
tent that provincial law allows 
(Hanley, 1985, p. 6). 
Additionally, the changes proposed in the 
Green Paper would exclude large "A" banks 
and all "B" banks from forming financial hold-
ing companies. 
According to Allan Taylor, former chair-
man of The Canadian Bankers' Association, the 
failure of the two regional banks succeeded in 
"putting the expansion of powers of financial 
institutions in the background and elevated 
the need in the minds of some for greater 
regulation and supervision" (Canadian 
Banker, June 1986, p. 22). It is however ex-
pected that the issue of schedule "C" banks 
will surface again in 1990 when Canada's Bank 
Act is scheduled for revision (Hanley, 1985, 
p. 7). 
The Future Of Canadian Bank 
Regulation 
According to economist Arthur Donner, a 
consultant to Research Securities of Canada 
Ltd., "The banking system has changed dramat-
ically in the past ten years but the regulatory 
system has stayed the same. It must be over-
hauled" (Maclean's, November 4, 1985, p. 46). 
As we have seen, the advent of regional bank-
ing in Canada has not been accompanied by 
stricter regulation and a closer inspection and 
supervisory system of the banking industry. All 
this has led Liberal Leader John Turner to ex-
claim recently, "This (the government's role in 
bank closings) is a monumental, billion-dollar 
goof on the part of the government" (Maclean's, 
September 23, 1985, p. 30). This being the case, 
what changes in regulation can we expect to 
see after the dust has finally cleared? 
As previously discussed, the failures of 
CCB and Northland and the paying back of 
uninsured depositors at taxpayers' expense 
have hurled the CDIC into the spotlight of the 
Canadian controversy over the banking crisis. 
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It is expected that future regulation will 
strengthen the role of the CDIC by providing 
the regulatory agency with new powers of ex-
amination and the ability to seize assets and 
change management. Additionally, a premium 
hike proposal (one which calls for premiums of 
one-tenth of one percent on insured deposits) 
is expected to raise $172 million a year to 
slowly cut the CDIC's deficit. Previously, pre-
miums had only brought the CDIC $51 million 
annually (United States Banker, p. 34). 
Regulatory changes which will affect the 
Inspector General of Banks are also expected. 
According to the Bank of Canada Governor, 
Gerald Bouey, "There is no mystery about why 
the bank (CCB) failed. The only mystery is why 
we did not know more about the condition of 
the Bank last March" (Maclean's, February 3, 
1986, p. 2). Bouey's comment clearly questions 
the adequacy and effectiveness of the Inspector 
General's role in bank inspection. Why, for 
example, did it take so long for the Inspector 
General to react? Why was it that the regional 
banks, a new venture in Canadian banking, 
were not examined more closely? Finally, how 
could the examination procedures have led to 
such severe miscalculations on the value of the 
bank's assets? 
It is expected that in the near future the 
office and powers of the Inspector General of 
Banks will be strengthened. Current recom-
mendations from the Minister of State for 
Finance include the addition of fourteen more 
staffers to the agency, an increase in the 
amount of training received by the staffers and 
an improvement of relations with the bank's 
appointed auditors (Canadian Business, De-
cember 1985, p. 150). More important, the In-
spector General of Banks is currently request-
ing "cease and desist" powers, which would be 
far more effective than simply moral suasion. 
Cease and desist powers (which U.S. regulators 
possess) would enable the Inspector General of 
Banks to block objectional acquisitions or 
deals. 
A technological overhau! of the country's 
inspection system is also desperately needed. 
As columnist George Hitchman writes, "The 
(bank) inspection system in this country is a 
sick joke. Our banks have up-to-date com-
puters but our examination system is based on 
green eyeshades" (United States Banker, p. 29). 
McDougall is also pushing to update the regu-
latory offices to include more state-of-the-art 
data systems. 
Conclusion 
Although CCB and Northland together 
accounted for less than 1% of Canadian bank 
assets, their demise created a major controversy 
for Canada. Since 1923, when the Home Bank 
of Canada collapsed because of fraudulent 
lending practices, the Canadian government 
had not presided over a single bank failure. 
Perhaps out of practice, the government's at-
tempt to financially "prop" the banks failed. 
The regional banking crisis succeeded in illu-
minating the weaknesses in Canadian bank 
regulation, while increasing the power of the 
already giant Big Six. If Canada desires re-
gional banking to survive, bank regulation 
must undergo change. However, even if the 
dream of regional banking is abandoned, Cana-
dian bank regulation is in need of reform, 
especially in the area of bank examination. 
Although the concept of regional banking 
was severely damaged in 1985, many still sup-
port the idea. The Big Six's image was once 
again enhanced with the failure of the two 
regional banks and subsequent runs on other 
banks. Many fear that the concentrated power 
the Big Six already possess (they currently con-
trol 95% of Canadian banking assets) will be in-
creased still further in years to come, due to the 
current lack of confidence in the regional 
banking system and the shelving of the Green 
Paper's idea of schedule "C" banks. It is also 
feared that such further concentration could 
increase the alienation of prairie capitalists. 
According to Allan Taylor, former chairman of 
the Canadian Bankers Association, "We're a 
young country. We need young businesses and 
financing for them" (Canadian Banker, p. 23). 
Further regulation is not only necessary to 
strengthen the regional banking system but 
ultimately to spur on the growth of small busi-
ness in Canada. 
Bank regulation in Canada is expected to 
undergo changes which may make Canadian 
bank regulation more similar to that in the 
United States. For example, the cease and 
desist powers desired by the Inspector General 
of Banks are similar to those in the U.S. regu-
latory system. But although a change in Cana-
dian bank regulation is needed, many question 
the sense of merely copying the U. S. model- a 
nation which had 79 bank failures in 1984 and 
120 in 1985 (out of approximately 14,500 total 
banks in the U. S.). However, the failures are 
not the issue. The issue is the weakness of the 
bank regulatory system in Canada, a system 
which failed to recognize and react to the bla-
tant problems at CCB until it was too late. 
Canadian bank regulation can be expected to 
incorporate changes that increase the power of 
the regulatory system by enabling the regula-
tors to diagnose bank problems and to react to 
them more quickly. Changes in regulation are 
necessary for the entire banking system, espe-
cially if Canada desires to support the concept 
of regional banking which will ultimately en-
hance growth in the small business sector. 
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